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Abstract
The aim of the Dublin system is to prevent positive and (most commonly) 
negative conflicts of competence regarding the determination of a peculiar prsonal 
status, by rapidly identifying a single responsible Member State (MS). This article 
discusses the performance of this set of rules, drawing inspiration from other areas 
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where a need for coordination of State powers arises and aims to ascertain whether 
the current Dublin III Regulation complies with the relevant guidelines and princi-
ples spelled out in EU primary law, in the Geneva Convention, and in the interna-
tional regime on Search and Rescue at Sea.
After having determined the unsatisfactory outcomes of the present rules, the es-
say takes a different approach, partially echoed in a report recently adopted by the 
European Parliament on the reform of the Dublin system and based on several in-
dispensable and mutually reinforcing elements: an enhanced recourse to connecting 
criteria inspired by a genuine link approach; the introduction of a permanent system 
of mandatory shares of applications, according to a proper reading of art. 80 TFEU; 
the adoption of reasonable incentives for States and applicants to fully participate 
in the system (including a qualified freedom of movement for work purposes); the 
simplification of the procedures. In doing so, the article takes the recent case law of 
the European Court of Justice into due account. 
Keywords
Asylum; European Union; Dublin regulation; competence; fair sharing of re-
sponsibilities.
LA ASIGNACIÓN DE COMPETENCIA EN LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS DE ASILO 
BAJO EL DERECHO DE LA UE: LA NECESIDAD DE COGER EL TORO DE 
DUBLÍN POR LOS CUERNOS
Resumen
La finalidad del sistema de Dublín es prevenir los conflictos positivos y nega-
tivos de competencia sobre la determinación de un peculiar estatuto personal, identi-
ficando de forma inmediata el Estado miembro responsable. Este artículo analiza los 
logros de este conjunto de reglas, sacando inspiración de otras áreas donde emerge la 
necesidad de coordinar la atribución de poderes estatales y determinando si el vigente 
Reglamento Dublín III cumple con los principios fundacionales del SECA, la Con-
vención de Ginebra y el régimen internacional de búsqueda y salvamento marítimo. 
Tras haber averiguado los límites de funcionamiento de la presente construc-
ción, el artículo hace hincapié en un enfoque diferente, acogido parcialmente en 
un reciente informe del Parlamento Europeo sobre la revisión del sistema Dublín y 
basado en varios elementos indispensables y complementarios: el mayor empleo de 
factores de conexión inspirados por un vínculo efectivo (genuine link); la introduc-
ción de un sistema permanente de cuotas obligatorias, de acuerdo con una inter-
pretación adecuada del art. 80 TFUE; la adopción de incentivos razonables para los 
Estados y los solicitantes con el fin de involucrarlos plenamente en el funcionamiento 
del sistema (incluyendo una libre circulación cualificada por motivos laborales); la 
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simplificación de los procedimientos. Finalmente, se tendrá en cuenta la reciente 
jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. 
Palabras claves
Asilo; Unión Europea; Reglamento de Dublín; competencia; reparto equitativo 
de la responsabilidad.
L’ATTRIBUTION DE COMPÉTENCE DANS LES PROCÉDURES D’ASILE EN VERTU 
DU DROIT DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE : LA NÉCESSITÉ DE PRENDRE LE 
TAUREAU DE DUBLIN PAR LES CORNES
Résumé
Le but du système Dublin est de déterminer rapidement l’État membre re-
sponsable de l’examen des demandes d’asile en tranchant les éventuels conflits de 
compétence positifs ou négatifs concernant ce statut personnel particulier. Tout 
d’abord, l’article analysera l’efficacité de cet ensemble de règles compte tenu des en-
seignements tirés dans autres domaines de coopération internationale, où des critères 
de compétence sont spécifiés et vérifient si l’actuel Règlement Dublin III se con-
forme aux lignes directrices pertinentes et aux principes énoncés dans le droit pri-
maire de l’UE, la Convention de Genève et le régime international de recherche et 
de sauvetage en mer.
Après avoir déterminé les résultats insatisfaisants du système légal courant, l’ar-
ticle adopte une approche différente, soutenu partiellement par le rapport adopté au 
Parlement européen concernent la révision du règlement Dublin. Il s’agit de com-
biner plusieurs éléments indispensables et complémentaires : un recours accru aux 
critères de compétence fondés sur des liens substantiels ; l’introduction d’un système 
permanent de quotas obligatoires selon une interprétation appropriée de l’art. 80 du 
TFUE ; l’adoption de mesures incitatives acceptables pour les Etats et les demandeurs 
d’asile (y compris une partielle liberté de séjour pour des raisons de travail) ; la simpli-
fication des procédures. La récente jurisprudence de la Cour de justice est également 
prise en compte.
Mots clés 
Asile; Union européenne; compétence; règlement de Dublin; partage équitable 
de responsabilités. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The international protection of asylum seekers has always been chal-
lenging, but the facts that have occurred in recent years around the Europe-
an neighborhood have raised an unprecedented debate among policymakers, 
public opinion and academics. One of the most debated issues concerns the 
perceivably unequal distribution of burdens across the international com-
munity, with some countries absorbing high shares of displaced persons and 
others doing little if nothing. The discussion on the degree of the actual com-
mitment of States to international protection is not new2, and it may be 
articulated on a global level or on a regional one, especially if a common area 
2 From this perspective, it is striking to note that the vast majority of refugees are hosted 
in States located close to the countries of origin and often characterised by low-in-
come economies. For a discussion of this topic, see, for instance, Dowd & McAdam 
(2017); Hathaway & Neve (1997); Milner (2016); Wall (2017). 
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of free movement and border control is in force. In this article, the latter 
focus will be adopted, taking the EU as a significant benchmark for critical 
reasoning on the allocation of State responsibility for hosting asylum seekers. 
It is well known that the launch of the Schengen area included the adop-
tion among the then members of the European Communities of common cri-
teria for allocating to one of them (and, by way of principle, to only one of 
them) the competence to determine the asylum claim and subsequently afford 
protection to the successful applicant. Such criteria were originally specified in 
the Convention signed in Dublin on 15 June 1990 by all the Member States 
and in the Convention implementing the Agreement of Schengen (arts. 28-38), 
signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 by some Member States. Those rules were 
later replaced by EC Regulation No. 343/2003 (the Dublin II Regulation) and, 
lastly, by EU Regulation No. 604/20133 (the Dublin III Regulation).
Following the publication of many critical studies4, the acute crisis in 
the effectiveness of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) provoked 
by the events that occurred between 2013 and 2016, and the exhortations 
coming from various actors (including the European Council5 and the Euro-
pean Parliament6), in May 2016, the European Commission put forward a 
proposal7 to revise the Dublin III Regulation (the Dublin IV proposal). 
I will not assess in detail the shortcomings of the Dublin system, which 
have been widely documented in the relevant literature8, and will not go into 
3 Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 
June 2013, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) (OJ 
L 180, of 29 June 2013, p. 31).
4 See, inter alia, Del Valle Gálvez (2016a); Feraci (2013: 6-7, 36-37); Fratzke (2015); 
Garlick (2016); Guild et al. (2015); Maiani (2016a); Mouzourakis (2014); Peers 
(2015).
5 See European Council, “Conclusions of 15 October 2015”, EUCO 26/15, § 3.
6 See European Parliament, “Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Med-
iterranean and the need for a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI))”, 
A8-0066/2016, 12-4-2016, §§ 33-38.
7 See “Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determin-
ing the Member State responsible for examining an application for international pro-
tection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast)”, COM (2016) 270 final, 4-5-2016.
8 In addition to the references indicated in footnote 3, see also Den Heijer et al. (2016: 
610-614); ICF International (2015); ICF International (2016); Maiani (2016b: 12-
27); Wagner et al. (2016: 44-53); UNHCR (2017).
46  MARCELLO DI FILIPPO
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 59, enero-abril (2018), pp. 41-95
the details of the Dublin IV proposal, which has already been severely crit-
icised by numerous observers9. Rather, this article aims to develop a critical 
discussion of the relevant criteria for attributing competence to a single MS 
(not fundamentally questioned in the mentioned proposal) by adopting a 
conceptual framework in line with trends detectable in other significant areas 
in which a need to coordinate States’ powers arises. It will emerge that, in 
order to be workable, any allocation system must satisfy several requirements: 
coherence with principles and values at stake; drafting of reasonable grounds 
for distributing competence; identification of the national authority which 
is best placed for managing a legal procedure (section II). The subsequent 
scrutiny of the present Dublin system will reveal its incapacity — as a whole 
— to cope with the relevant principles and values, retrieved in the primary 
rules governing EU asylum law and in international rules such as the Geneva 
Convention and the regime on the safety of life at sea (section III). A critical 
appraisal of the tool box at the disposal of the EU legislature when giving 
shape to a system of allocation is thereby proposed. An analysis is performed 
of the pros and cons of the main connecting criteria so far employed or pro-
posed in the debate about the reform of the system (family ties, country of 
first entry, free choice). The discussion is then centred on the feasibility of an 
approach based on wider recourse to meaningful connections: substantial and 
procedural aspects will be covered, in the view that both are indispensable for 
a functioning system where the best placed authority is called to act. More 
importantly, it will be emphasised that it is time to break the taboo of quotas 
and that only a permanent mechanism for the fair sharing of applications 
can fully unfold the potentialities of newly drafted allocation criteria (section 
IV). Some tentative conclusions are proposed, highlighting that a discussion 
on the possible content of a different Dublin system is not just a theoretical 
speculation, but could provide a valid contribution to rebuild confidence in 
the ability of the EU to develop a credible and fair asylum area (section V).
In the course of the analysis, due account will be taken of the recent case 
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and of the innovative position 
adopted by the European Parliament in the context of the legislative proce-
dure concerning the Dublin IV proposal (the Wikström Report)10.
9 Among the first commentaries, see Capicchiano Young (2017); Chetail (2016a: 594-
598); Di Filippo (2016); Favilli (2017: 293-298); Hruschka (2016); Maiani (2016b); 
Morgese (2017); Vitiello (2016).
10 European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Rap-
porteur Cecilia Wikström), “Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
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II. THE DUBLIN SYSTEM AS A TOOL FOR COORDINATING STATES’ 
COMPETENCE AND THE TRENDS EMERGING FROM OTHER FIELDS 
IN WHICH DELIMITATION OF STATE POWER IS DEALT WITH
According to its Preamble, the declared purpose of the Dublin III Reg-
ulation11 is to establish a “clear and workable method for determining the 
Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum application”, a 
method “based on objective, fair criteria both for the Member States and for 
the persons concerned” and able to “determine rapidly the Member State 
responsible, so as to guarantee effective access to the procedures for granting 
international protection and not to compromise the objective of the rapid 
processing of applications for international protection”.
To this author’s knowledge12, no other precedent regarding the drafting 
of multilateral general and abstract rules for allocating competence in asylum 
procedures is detectable in international practice, while on a bilateral level the 
example of Canada/US cooperation may be quoted13.
Taking inspiration from the wording of the Preamble, the temptation is 
high to establish an analogy with the private international law terminology 
and to operate a sort of legal transliteration: The aim of the Dublin rules 
would be to prevent positive and (more commonly) negative conflicts of ju-
risdiction (meaning adjudicative power) over a peculiar personal status, by 
rapidly determining a single responsible Member State (MS). Nevertheless, 
caution is needed. The procedure for asserting the entitlement to interna-
tional protection (to which the Dublin rules apply) is not usually framed as 
the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protec-
tion lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast)”, A8-0345/2017, 6-11-2017.
11 See recitals Nos. 4-5 of the Dublin III Regulation. 
12 Some discussions were held in the Mercosur with the view of adopting an Agreement 
inspired by the Dublin II Regulation and by the then draft Council Directive on 
minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status (later 
adopted as Directive 2005/85/EC, OJ L 326, of 13 December 2005, p. 13), following 
the presentation of a draft by Argentina in 2002: see Foro Especializado Migratorio 
del Mercosur, Anteproyecto de Acuerdo para la determinacion del responsable del examen 
de las solicitudes de refugio en el Mercosur, doc. MERCOSUR/RMI/FEM/ACTA No. 
1/04, annex VII (14-16 April 2004). The discussions were later discontinued.
13 See the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
United States of America for cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims 
from nationals of third countries, done in Washington D.C. on 5 December 2002, 
entered into force on 29 December 2004 (the Canada/US Agreement).
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a typically judicial one, being rather peculiar and lying in a grey area between a 
classical administrative procedure and a quasi-judicial proceeding, according to 
the common law terminology14. It equally holds true that, as UNHCR (2011: 
§ 28) aptly underlined, the status determination procedure has a declarative 
nature of the entitlement to precise subjective rights. From this perspective, it 
cannot be deemed so distant from certain non-contentious proceedings regard-
ing personal or familiar statuses15, which in some States are entrusted to the 
judiciary whereas in others to specialised administrative authorities. 
Here it is assumed that refugee status determination (RSD) procedures 
belong to the administrative competence of MSs and not to the judicial func-
tion proper: at the same time, this kind of administrative procedures bears 
some affinities with judicial activities (especially the non-contentious one), 
being both a manifestation of jurisdiction by the relevant State. When meant 
as determining the ability of States “to regulate or otherwise impact upon 
people, property and circumstances” — as Shaw (2008: 645) puts it — juris-
diction may take the form of legislative, executive or judicial action or com-
petence16. In the context of international cooperation, it is rare to find legal 
instruments addressing the allocation of executive competence, given that this 
topic is usually developed having in mind a strict correlation between terri-
tory and the activities of public authorities17. However, the EU legal order 
has developed some examples of allocation schemes in the executive realm, 
which may offer some interesting insights. Conversely, in the international 
14 Actually, the solutions envisaged in the domestic legal orders vary considerably, so 
that the EU Qualification Directive clarifies that “determining authority” means any 
quasi-judicial or administrative body in a Member State responsible for examining 
applications for international protection competent to take decisions at first instance 
in such cases» (emphasis added): see art. 2 (f ), Directive 2013/32/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, on common procedures for granting 
and withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180, of 29 June 2013, p. 60).
15 As merely illustrative examples: declaration of statelessness; rectification of civil status 
records; declaration of absence or of presumed death; approval of amicable separation 
of spouses; adoption of minors or of adults; recognition of motherhood or father-
hood.
16 The notion here discussed must be kept distinct from the meaning of the term juris-
diction as a threshold criterion to be satisfied in order for certain treaty obligations to 
arise: see, e.g., Milanovic (2011: 19-34), with a special focus on human rights treaties.
17 Rather, the questions more often raised in the practice are the recognition of foreign 
administrative acts and the definition of instruments of cooperation between national 
bodies, each one competent in its own territory: see, for instance, the classical work 
by Biscottini (1964).
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arena, it is rather common to encounter treaties or other binding instruments 
regulating the coordination of judicial competence in civil, commercial and 
criminal matters. 
Against this background, in order to fuel the debate on a different way to 
conceive the Dublin system and to provide fresh arguments for the overhaul 
of the its current tenets, some inspiration may be drawn from the regimes 
developed in EU law, where the organisation of the competence of national 
administrative authorities has been addressed, and from the experience gained 
in the allocation of judicial competence, being that this form of public power 
insists on the efficient organization of legal procedures and has enjoyed more 
elaboration in international practice18.
As far as the administrative realm is concerned, a sector where the EU 
has elaborated guidelines on the allocation of competence to State authorities 
is competition law. In particular, following the entry into force of Regula-
tion 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down 
in arts. 101 and 102 TFEU19, the role of domestic competition authorities 
sharply increased and, as a corollary, a need emerged to organise the dis-
tribution of tasks among them. In a joint statement annexed to the Regu-
lation, the Council and the Commission acknowledged that cases “will be 
dealt with by a single competition authority as often as possible” and that, 
in order to designate the authority which is “well placed to act” (emphasis 
added) all relevant factors will be taken into account, and “in particular in 
which markets the main anti-competitive effects are felt and which author-
ity is most able to deal with a case successfully depending on the ability of 
the authority to gather evidence, to bring the infringement to an end and 
to apply sanctions effectively” (emphasis added)20. In a related Notice draft-
ed in close cooperation with Member States, the Commission provided 
18 Far from establishing a simplistic equation between RSD procedures and contentious 
judicial proceedings, here it is simply suggested to bear in mind that the attribution 
of States’ powers in the conduct of legal procedures raises common issues, regardless 
of the form of public function concerned and the subject involved (it is sufficient that 
it may pose issues of international interference or coordination in the States’ action).
19 Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of the Council, of 16 December 2002, on the implementa-
tion of the rules on competition laid down in arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 
of 4 January 2003, p. 1).
20 Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the functioning of the net-
work of competition authorities, 15435/02 ADD 1, 10-12-2002, §§ 15-16. It is also 
specified that a single national authority “will be usually well placed to act if only one 
Member State is substantially affected by an agreement or practice, particularly when 
the main anti-competitive effects appear in the same Member State and all participating 
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additional clarifications as to those connecting criteria and meaningfully 
explained that those factors “indicate that a material link between the in-
fringement and the territory of a Member State must exist in order for that 
Member State’s competition authority to be considered well placed” (em-
phasis added)21.
Another area of concern for the EU is short-term visas, regulated 
in the Community Visa Code22. When determining the MS competent 
to receive a visa application, art. 5 of the Visa Code logically follows a 
criterion inspired by a connecting factor approach, by stating that the 
MS competent to examine and decide on an application for a uniform 
visa shall be the MS whose territory constitutes the sole destination of the 
visit(s) or, if the visit includes more than one destination, the MS whose 
territory constitutes the main destination of the visit(s) in terms of the 
length or purpose of stay23.
The protective regime on the processing and the trans-border circu-
lation of personal data is also illustrative. Under Directive 95/4624, a pro-
vision identifying the applicable national law is contained in art. 4 (1) (a), 
which states that “each Member State shall apply the national provisions it 
adopts pursuant to this Directive to the processing of personal data where: 
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an estab-
lishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State”. According 
to art. 28, the applicable law identifies the competent supervisory authority 
as well, although practical implementation may lead to the intervention 
of different national authorities25. What appears to be relevant here is that 
companies to an agreement or an abusive behavior have their seat in that Member 
State”.
21 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities 
(OJ C 101, of 27 April 2004, p. 43), §§ 8-9.
22 Regulation (EC) 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 13 
July 2009, establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ L 243, of 15 
September 2009, p. 1).
23 See also the Commission Decision establishing the Handbook for the processing of 
visa applications and the modification of issued visas, C (2010) 1620 final, 19.3.2010, 
§§ 2.1-2.2, where some concrete examples are given. Even this soft-law instrument 
was drafted in close cooperation with Member States. 
24 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 24 October 
1995, on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 281, of 23 November 1995, p. 31). 
25 See for the instance the questions decided by the Court of Justice in the judgement of 
1 October 2015, Weltimmo, C‑230/14, EU:C:2015:639. 
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both the Preamble of the Directive26 and the ECJ case law27 underline the 
need to ascertain a substantial connection between the processing of person-
al data and a State territory in order to match the requirement of “activities 
carried out in the context of an establishment”. The legislative framework is 
undergoing a significant change, as a new regulation repealing the directive, 
adopted in 201628, will be applicable from 25 May 2018. Nevertheless, the 
elements relevant to determining the competent supervisory authority (or 
authorities) and the newly established notion of “lead supervisory authori-
ty” are again pervaded by a logic of assessing the substantive links between 
the activities at stake and the competent State(s)29 and to single out the 
authority (or authorities) best placed to act.
What emerges from this merely illustrative list of regimes for distributing 
competence in the executive field looks to be in line with a general trend which 
may be observed in international law, where State powers are claimed or con-
ferred in the presence of grounds which are deemed acceptable because of the 
existence of a reasonable connection between the acting State and the situation 
concerned. Which allocation criteria are acceptable and which are not must be 
addressed with regard to the kind of public power exerted (legislative, executive, 
judicial) and the specificity of the subject-matter, the values at stake and the 
general interests of the international community or sectors of the same30. An 
overview of the delimitation of the entire set of State competences would be 
impossible and certainly would exceed the purpose of this article. However, as 
already mentioned, the RSD procedure presents some affinities with judicial 
proceedings, at least for the circumstance that it deals with the impartial assess-
ment of facts and circumstances in the context of a legal procedure and with the 
26 See Recital 19, where it is specified that “establishment on the territory of a Member 
State implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements”, 
and that “the legal form of such an establishment, whether simply branch or a subsid-
iary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this respect”. 
27 See Weltimmo, §§ 28-39. 
28 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 27 
April 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/
EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, of 4 May 2016, p. 1). 
29 See for instance Recitals 36 and 124-128; arts. 4 (16) (22) and 55-56. See also art. 29 
Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines for identifying a controller or processor’s lead 
supervisory authority, adopted on 13 December 2016 and revised on 5 April 2017, 16/
EN WP 244 rev.01.
30 See inter alia Cassese (2001: 260-261); Mills (2014: 194-209); Oxman (2007); 
Vischer (2011). 
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adoption of a decision having legal consequence on a personal status. If these 
assumptions may be deemed acceptable, then a look at the stance of the inter-
national community through some targeted references may prove interesting. 
Decades of international cooperation for the purpose of allocating judicial com-
petence show that a primary consideration is given to the material connection 
of a situation or person with the State’s legal order and community (as happens 
with legislative and executive jurisdiction too), and to the need to ensure an ef-
ficient and (possibly) speedy development of the legal procedure. The State best 
placed to properly hear a case and the country having an objective link with the 
situation, interests or legal rights at stake are usually considered entitled to assert 
exclusive, primary or (in some instances) concurrent adjudicative power31. An 
illustrative gallery of examples may be drawn from multilateral treaties adopted 
in distinct fora, widely ratified by the concerned States and addressing the fight 
against criminal activities32 or cooperation in civil33 or commercial34 matters, as 
well as from EU legislation in similar settings35.
31 See the authors quoted at footnote 30 and Von Mehren (2002: 27-73).
32 See inter alia the European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, 
done in Delphi on 23 June 1985, art. 13; the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 
of 15 November 2000, art. 15; the European Convention on Cybercrime, done in 
Budapest on 23 November 2001, art. 22; the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 31 October 
2003, art. 42.
33 See inter alia the Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, adopted at 
Montevideo on 15 July 1989, art. 8; the European Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, done in Lugano 
on 21 June 1993, art. 19; the Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects, done in Rome on 24 June 1995, art. 8; the Convention on Juris-
diction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of 
Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, done at The 
Hague on 19 October 1996, arts. 5-14; the Convention on the International Protec-
tion of Adults, done at The Hague on 13 January 2000, arts. 5-12.
34 See inter alia the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods 
by Road (CMR), done at Geneva on 19 May 1956, art. 31; the European Convention 
on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, done in Istanbul on 5 June 1990, 
art. 4; the Mercosur Protocol on Jurisdiction in Contractual Matters, done in Buenos 
Aires on 5 August 1994.
35 The EU normative framework is particularly illustrative: see inter alia Regulation 
(EC) No. 2201/2003 of the Council, of 27 November 2003, concerning jurisdic-
tion and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and 
the matters of parental responsibility (OJ L 338, of 23 December 2003, p. 1), arts. 
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This brief excursus carried out in the administrative and in judicial con-
texts confirms the validity of the “connecting factors” idea and of the need to 
build around it a workable mechanism for identifying the State best placed 
to act. 
Coming again to the asylum field, what must be now investigated are 
the grounds that may be deemed relevant and rational, considering the pecu-
liarities of the subject matter and the principles and values at stake36. In order 
to do so, first, whether the Dublin III Regulation — as it stands — is able to 
comply with its wide-ranging guiding  principles and other relevant interna-
tional rules must be verified (section III). Second, an open-minded enquiry 
into the criteria so far employed is due, with a view to explain the current 
failures and propose a more robust recourse to meaningful criteria for singling 
out the most appropriate State authority (section IV). 
III. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM IN ITS BROADER 
LEGAL CONTEXT 
This section discusses the current performance of the Dublin system as 
an allocative mechanism is carried out. As yardsticks of reference the guid-
ing principles of the CEAS (as enriched by the Lisbon Treaty) will be pri-
marily taken into account. However, the interaction with other legal regimes 
grounded in international law and relevant for this field will also be examined 
3-20; Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 13 
December 2011, on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children 
and child pornography (OJ L 335, of 17 December 2011, p. 1), art. 17; Regulation 
(EU) No. 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 4 July 2012, 
on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and accep-
tance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the 
creation of a European Certificate of Succession (OJ L 201, of 27 July 2012, p. 107), 
arts. 4-19; Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, of 12 December 2012, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 351, of 20 December 2012, p. 1), 
arts. 4-35; Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
of 15 March 2017, on combating terrorism (OJ L 88, of 31 March 2017, p. 6), art. 
19.
36 This also explains why the connecting factor idea, albeit common to various legal 
fields (as outlined above), requires a distinct analysis for each relevant area, and it is 
not fruitful to insist too much on a detailed comparison of the various ways in which 
it is declined. A different stance would lead to a merely descriptive approach. 
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in order to offer a complete picture of the inadequacy of the rule currently in 
force and of the strong exigency of a substantial change.
1. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE CEAS AND THE INABILITY  
OF THE DUBLIN SYSTEM TO COMPLY WITH THEM 
When critically discussing the Dublin system, it is necessary to place it 
in the broader context of the CEAS, taking into due account the evolution 
that the Treaties underwent after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
It is of pivotal importance to remember that the Dublin Regulation (the cur-
rent one, or a future one) is not a self-contained regime. Likewise, it must 
not be treated as a taboo, impermeable to discussions on its past and current 
contents. 
As a first step in this analysis, it should be kept in mind that the guiding 
principles (or foundations) of the CEAS are, according to art. 78 (1) TFEU: 
offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring interna-
tional protection; ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement 
(in the version enshrined in art. 19 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU-
CFR); fully respecting the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties. More broadly, the 
EU Charter (and in particular, its art. 1837) must be taken into account when 
designing and interpreting EU rules on asylum.
Furthermore, according to art. 80 TFEU, the EU asylum policy must 
be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, 
including (but not limited to) its financial implications, between the Member 
States. The aforementioned provision underlines that, whenever necessary, 
the Union acts adopted in this field must contain appropriate measures to give 
effect to this principle. If it is true that the mentioned principle is not a direct-
ly enforceable one and requires the exercise of legislative and political discre-
tion for its implementation38, it is worth stressing that the need to conciliate 
EU acts with art. 80 TFEU cannot be confined to ad hoc emergency measures, 
but must also encompass general and abstract provisions. In fact, nothing in 
the wording and in the spirit of art. 80 TFEU precludes its scope from em-
37 “The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the sta-
tus of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union”.
38 On art. 80, see inter alia Gestri (2011); Morgese (2014); Vanheule et al. (2011).
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bracing the same drafting of general rules39: They may have a financial char-
acter, or concern operational support, or even frame the general features of 
the CEAS, such as the criteria assigning responsibility to individual Member 
States (i.e. the current Dublin III Regulation). This holds true, in particular, 
when it is proven beyond any reasonable doubt that those provisions, already 
in force, cause unfair and inefficient results. The fact that the Dublin system 
was not originally conceived as a responsibility or burden sharing mechanism 
cannot be a justification for the maintenance of its main tenets after the en-
try into force of the Lisbon Treaty and in light of its repeatedly tested (bad) 
performance: art. 80 TFEU is a binding principle for the EU legislature, and 
this applies in the context of the drafting of both general rules and emergency 
driven measures. 
In its recent judgement on the relocation litigation, the Grand Chamber 
of the Court of Justice did not miss the occasion to solemnly recall that the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Mem-
ber States “governs EU asylum policy” and that it “applies, under Article 80 
TFEU, when the EU common policy on asylum is implemented”40. Addi-
tionally, even art. 67 (2) TFEU (stating that the Union “shall frame a com-
mon policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on 
solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nation-
als”, emphasis added) proves relevant by underlining the need not to omit the 
consequences within the personal sphere of the asylum seekers.
It is no surprise that the same Dublin III Regulation41 identifies that a pri-
mary goal of this set of rules is to rapidly determine the MS responsible and to 
put it in the best situation to carry out the refugee settlement procedure (RSD), 
employing criteria that are fair both for the MSs and the applicants (emphasis 
added). This represents another yardstick against which to measure the sound-
ness of the current legislative framework. Considering that the effect of the 
Dublin regulation is to affirm a strict system of coordination of exclusive com-
petence (and not alternative or concurrent, for the disposal of the applicants), 
39 For a similar view, see Basilien-Gainche (2011: 251-253); De Bruycker & Tsourdi 
(2016a: 512); Di Filippo (2017: 451-452); Garlick (2016: 167-168); Gestri (2011: 
904-905); Gray (2013: 179-180, 191-192); Karageorgiou (2016: 6-7); Kuçuk (2016: 
448, 458-461); Moreno-Lax (2017: 751-754); Morgese (2014: 474-476); Tsourdi 
(2017: 672-675).
40 Judgement 6 September 2017, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the Eu-
ropean Union, joined cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, EU:C:2017:631, § 252 and § 
291.
41 See recitals 4-5. 
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it is even more crucial to verify whether the choice of the competent State is 
driven by rationality and fairness.
This being said, more than twenty years of implementation of the Dub-
lin system have shown that, as currently framed, it simply does not work, 
either in “calm” periods or in times of “crisis”42. As far as the Member States 
are concerned, they do not really cooperate and do not fully respect their 
obligations, appearing more interested in shifting responsibilities as much as 
they can. The Dublin procedures are very slow and often end up dans une 
impasse. The frontline States may suffer a disproportionate burden as a con-
sequence of the criteria set out in the relevant provisions. The presumption 
of the equivalence of the national asylum systems — upon which the Dublin 
rules are based — is flawed, and the applicants know this perfectly. As a conse-
quence, some second line countries, which have more efficient and/or gener-
ous asylum systems or better socioeconomic conditions, become the favourite 
destinations in secondary movements, fueling social tension and provoking 
additional pressure on national budgets. 
Furthermore, a careful assessment of the material dynamics of the ap-
plicants provides additional indications. The fact that no reasonable room is 
given to a consideration of asylum seekers’ preferences or their prospects for 
integration creates a trend against spontaneous compliance and towards sec-
ondary movements. Focusing instead on the (prospectively) recognised holder 
of international protection, he/she will have to face a long-term process of in-
tegration in the hosting State, which may prove to be extremely complicated 
when there are not substantial links with the local environment. This might 
have a high financial impact on the host State (costs for language courses, 
assisting the protected persons in integrating and finding a job, countering 
probable social exclusion, etc.) and also negatively reflect on the capacity of 
the protected person to reach independence from State aid in a short time, to 
stimulate self-empowerment, and to positively contribute to the cultural and 
social development of the country concerned. A frustrated, poorly integrated 
and under-employed refugee is a problem not only for the person involved, 
but also for the host community: Such a situation is a lose-lose one, both for 
the refugee and the host State43.
The poor performance of the Dublin system generates high costs of 
different natures, such as: (a) the waste of public money in repressive actions 
and in administrative procedures which are slow and do not produce durable 
42 For all relevant references, see Maiani (2016b: 12-27); Wagner et al. (2016: 44-53).
43 On these aspects, see inter alia Byrne & Shacknove (1996: 205-207); Noll (2002: 
313, 319-321).
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results44; (b) diplomatic tensions between the Member States and excessive 
burdens for some of them, sometimes leading to the collapse of the national 
asylum system, wave-through policies and the reinstatement of checks at in-
ternal borders (to the detriment of the whole Schengen area); (c) profit mak-
ing for criminal networks providing smuggling services; (d) social exclusion 
and frustration for asylum-seekers; (e) the lack of integration for recognised 
refugees, with increased costs for social services and public expenditures.
To sum up, the current rules and their usual implementation do not 
offer any guarantee that quick access to an asylum procedure will be granted, 
that responsibility will be assigned in a fair and efficient manner, that appro-
priate status will be afforded to the beneficiaries of international protection, 
or that the principle of fair sharing of responsibilities and solidarity among 
the MSs will truly be implemented. All this is already sufficient to justify a 
radical overhaul of the Dublin machinery in force. But additional arguments 
may be drawn from the relevant international provisions, some of which are 
explicitly named in art. 78 TFEU.
2. THE UNDERLYING TENSION WITH THE GENEVA CONVENTION
Considering that all the MSs are bound by the Geneva Convention and 
that the same art. 78 TFEU subordinates the CEAS to the full respect of that 
treaty, is the Dublin system coherent with international refugee law when it 
states that the applicant may ask for protection in only one MS, which is not 
necessarily the one chosen by him/her? At a first glance, the Convention does 
not deal with the issue of the distribution of responsibilities among the con-
tracting parties. Its main purpose is to establish a set of obligations binding 
any contracting State under whose jurisdiction an asylum claim is presented 
(regardless of how the person actually arrived), and a correspondent set of 
rights afforded to the applicant and (mainly) to the prospective refugee. 
The fact that a contracting State refuses to grant protection and trans-
fers the responsibility (and the applicant) to another State requires a careful 
examination because this might imply an evasion of the relevant treaty obliga-
tions. As a matter of international law, it has been noted that the Convention 
implicitly recognises a right to choose the State to lodge an application among 
44 This waste of money concerns the Member States’ budgets, but has negative effects 
even on EU expenditures. In fact, the European funds given to the Member States to 
manage the processing of asylum claims and the subsequent integration of the per-
sons entitled to international protection may prove ineffective. The same goes for the 
funds devoted to facing emergencies caused by extraordinary flows.
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the contracting parties, not obliging the concerned person to seek asylum 
only in the first safe country encountered during his/her flight45. According 
to the prevailing view, however, international practice shows that this implicit 
freedom should be weighed against the faculty for the State concerned to 
transfer the responsibility to a safe third country willing to accept it and re-
specting the Convention (including not only the non-refoulement guarantee, 
but even the substantive rights enshrined in its provisions) and basic human 
rights46. In this respect, it does not seem that art. 18 of the EUCFR has funda-
mentally altered the framework, although it is certain that it gives prominence 
to the position of the individual and, according to several scholars47, affords 
a subjective right to be granted asylum once it is verified that the conditions 
laid down in the Geneva Convention and in the Qualification Directive48 
have been met. It is not possible to explore this issue more thoroughly here, 
but it must be recognised that the safe third country concept is challenging49 
and that it has developed into various devices, all of which share the fact that 
the will of the asylum seeker does not play a determinant role: The EU itself 
codified this in the Dublin system (regarding infra-regional allocation)50 and 
45 See among others Cannizzaro (2011: 442-443); Durieux (2009: 78-79); Gaja (2014: 
139-142, 144); Gil-Bazo (2007: 176-180); Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007: 392-
396); Hathaway (2011: 3-4); Moreno-Lax (2015: 691-695). Contra, see Hailbronner 
(1993: 58, 61-64); Lambert (1995: 91-98). 
46 See inter alia Byrne and Shacknove (1996: 214 et seq.); Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 
(2007: 392-396); Hathaway (2011: 3-4). See also UNHCR (1994), UN General As-
sembly, “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants”, A/RES/71/1, 19.9.2016 
(hereinafter, ‘the New York Declaration’), §70.
47 See Bodart (2018); Carlier (2002: 185-186); Den Heijer (2014); Gil-Bazo (2008); 
Gortázar Rotaeche (2009: 624-627). 
 It is worth underlining that those opinions refer to situations in which the competent 
MS (according to the Dublin rules) has already been determined, and not to the issue 
of the right to choose that State.
48 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 13 De-
cember 2011, on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees 
or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted (OJ L 337, of 20 December 2011, p. 9).
49 Amongst the recent contributions, see the extensive and detailed essay of Moreno-Lax 
(2015: 695-705, with further references).
50 Recently, the Court of Justice confirmed such view: judgement 6 September 2017 
(Grand Chamber), Slovakia and Hungary v. Council of the European Union, joined 
cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, EU:C:2017:631, §§ 338-342.
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in the Procedures Directive (with regard to non-EU countries)51. At the same 
time, it is true that (as art. 78 TFEU clearly spells out) legal instruments such 
as the Dublin III Regulation are subordinated to the Geneva Convention, and 
that — if art. 18 of the Charter must be taken seriously — the position of the 
individual cannot be reduced to a mere object in the legal framework. 
Leaving aside the issue of the safe third country concept as regulated in 
the view of transferring responsibility to non-EU countries and focusing here 
only on the Dublin system, it seems sound to state that whereas the allocation 
of jurisdiction reduces the scope for the self-determination of the applicant 
and objectively disposes of his or her “fate”, great care must be given to the 
actual level and quality of the asylum system of the designated MS, as a formal 
respect for the Convention or the sole implementation of the non-refoulement 
guarantee are not sufficient. Not by chance, art. 78 TFEU speaks of a “full 
implementation” of the Convention, and words do bear legal consequences. 
On this point, notwithstanding the parallel harmonisation of substantive and 
procedural issues52, a certain tension is still present, and it cannot be simply 
removed by the ECJ case law53. In my opinion, this would justify the search 
51 Directive 2013/32 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26 June 2013, 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (re-
cast) (OJ L 180, of 29 June 2013, p. 60).
52 The Dublin Convention and the Dublin II Regulation were disappointing regarding 
this aspect, as they did not take into account the possibility that the competent MS 
would not offer a guarantee of actual respect for the Geneva Convention, basic hu-
man standards and the relevant EU rules on reception, procedures, qualification and 
treatment: see, for instance, the critical remarks advanced by Guild (1999: 320-321); 
Hathaway (2011: 1-4, 7). 
53 The European Court of Justice started addressing this issue in its landmark judgement 
of 21 December 2011, N. S. and Others, C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, EU:C:2011:865, 
inspired by the case law of the European Court on Human Rights (see especial-
ly judgement 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, no. 30696/09, 
CE:ECHR:2011:0121JUD003069609).
 The Dublin III Regulation partly remedied the mentioned gap by introducing the 
current art. 3 (2), which, however, leaves room for transfers where an individual risk 
of violation of essential rights is not due to “systematic flaws” in the asylum procedure 
and in the reception conditions for applicants: for a similar criticism, see inter alia Fe-
raci (2013: 25); Chetail (2016b: 34-35); Maiani (2016a: 133-138); Vedsted-Hansen 
(2016: 338-352). 
 Recently, the ECJ paved the way for a more balanced harmonisation between human 
rights standards and the implementation of the Dublin III Regulation: see Judgement 
16 February 2017 (Chamber), C. K., H. F., A. S. v Republika Slovenija, C‑578/16 
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for different solutions, striking a new balance between the States’ discretion 
and the applicant’s perspective, as already noted by Gaja (2014: 144-145). 
Another argument about the opportunity to seriously reconceive Dublin 
may be drawn from the somewhat puzzling relationship between the rationale 
of the criteria of first entry therein specified and the full implementation of 
the non-refoulement guarantee enshrined in art. 33 of the Geneva Convention 
and later guaranteed in other international instruments (last but not least, art. 
19 of the EUCFR), as will be detailed below (section IV.2.1). 
Finally, the preamble of the Geneva Convention contains a policy for-
mula which is too often neglected. The Parties expressly recognise that “the 
grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and 
that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has 
recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international co-operation”. The evaluation of fairness/unfairness 
at the global level has always proven challenging. Nevertheless, internation-
al cooperation at a regional level, if carried out, should aim at relieving the 
overburdened States (both the first line and second line ones) of part of the 
responsibility, and not at aggravating their duties. Since the Dublin system is 
a form of concerted management of refugee claims, it can be matched against 
this policy principle. However, the outcome cannot be satisfactory due to the 
reasons mentioned in section III.1. 
3. THE SIDE EFFECTS ON THE SEARCH-AND-RESCUE REGIME AT SEA
A final (but equally worrying) side effect of the Dublin system concerns 
the adherence to the rule on the safeguarding of life at sea in the context 
of mixed flows affecting the EU Member States54. Due to geographical and 
logistic reasons, or to the “closure” of certain terrestrial routes and of the to-
tality of the air routes, the vast majority of irregular arrivals of asylum seekers 
occur through the maritime route. In the recent past, the conduct of search 
and rescue (SAR) operations has been conditioned in a negative way by the 
current state of affairs, whereas the EU country accepting disembarkation 
is usually bound to assume responsibility for the asylum seekers under the 
PPU, EU:C:2017:127, §§ 90-94; Judgement 26 July 2017 (Grand Chamber), Jafari, 
C-646/16, EU:C:2017:586, § 101.
54 On this challenging subject, see inter alia Acosta Sánchez (2017); Di Filippo (2014b); 
Marinai (2016); Moreno-Lax and Papastavridis (2016); Parisciani (2015). 
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Dublin rules55 and to manage the presence of other migrants with an irregular 
status as far as entry and stay are concerned. A situation is created in which 
the EU coastal State willing to facilitate SAR operations or to strengthen its 
rescuing capacities — thus contributing to an enhanced enforcement of inter-
national maritime law — will be rewarded by the additional burden of assum-
ing responsibility for asylum seekers and other migrants under the applicable 
EU provisions. This might explain why, on some occasions, certain coastal 
States have refused or delayed disembarkation from rescuing ships (regardless 
of whether they are private or public vessels), or why commercial ships — 
being aware of the risk of being caught in a diplomatic disagreement among 
the relevant coastal States — preferred to refrain from intervening in order to 
save time and money. 
At the same time, the aforementioned reward argument helps us to un-
derstand why multilateral naval missions in the Mediterranean Sea suffer from 
relatively little participation by non-Mediterranean States; even when the na-
val assets are deployed, this is regularly made conditional upon the acceptance 
of a rule of engagement providing for the disembarkation of the rescued peo-
ple in the coastal country which is entrusted with the general coordination 
function of the mission or closer to the SAR event56. It is not by coincidence 
that, in order to avoid disincentives for the State accepting disembarkation or 
for the (prospective) rescuing ships, the UNHCR has underlined on several 
55 To this author’s knowledge, no Southern EU MS has officially questioned the appli-
cability of the criterion of first entry to asylum seekers disembarked after a SAR oper-
ation, although the issue of the unfair effects of such interpretation is increasingly be-
ing raised at the political level, especially in the context of the drafting or adjourning 
of the operational plan of joint missions such as Triton, Sophia or Themis: for some 
references, see Caffio (2018); The New York Times (2018). In new EU sea mission, 
ships not obliged to bring migrants to Italy, The New York Times, 1-2-2018. 
 At the EU level, some doubts were raised by Advocate General Sharpston in the Opin-
ion delivered on 20 June 2017 in the case Mengesteab, C-670/16, EU:C:2017:480, 
§§ 44-57. In addition, drawing inspiration from the Opinion issued by Sharpston on 
8 June 2017 (EU:C:2017:443) in the cases C-490/16 (A.S. v Republic of Slovenia) 
and C-646/16 (Jafari), the applicability of art. 13 Dublin III Regulation might be 
questioned at least in the event of a massive inflow of people by sea (see especially § 
189 of the Opinion). However, the Court, in the two judgements delivered on 26 July 
2017 (EU:C:2017:585 and EU:C:2017:586), held a different vision on this point: see 
infra, section IV.2.2. 
56 See the operative plan of the joint missions Triton and EUNAVFOR MED Sophia. 
For further references, see, for instance, Marinai (2016: 924-926); Parisciani (2015: 
166-168).
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occasions that new solutions must be envisaged by pointing at delinking, in 
some instances, the acceptation of disembarkation and the assumption of re-
sponsibility for the rescued persons57.
In conclusion, it may be inferred that the Dublin scheme produces puni-
tive effects on Member States that are genuinely committed to respecting the 
SAR obligations under international maritime law. A tension with the latter 
duties can thus arise, but it is not unavoidable: It is sufficient to seriously dis-
cuss the tenets of the EU regime of responsibility allocation.
IV. THE WAY FORWARD: THE NEED TO RECONSIDER ALLOCATION 
CRITERIA ON A PRINCIPLED BASIS
In sum, the Dublin system produces results which are far from coherent 
with the guiding principles of the CEAS (as enshrined in arts. 76, 78 and 
80 TFEU and in the EUCFR) and with the objectives of the same Dublin 
III Regulation; moreover, it may determine outcomes which are inconsistent 
with other relevant international rules and principles. If viewed through the 
lens of the international lawyer and according to the trends detected above 
(section II), it does not set up a credible and workable definition of the rules 
for identifying the most convenient or appropriate forum for conducting the 
RSD procedure. When the outcome of a certain approach is flawed, no ra-
tional lawmaker should insist on it58. Again, the history of the evolution of 
the jurisdictional grounds in civil and criminal matters59 is revealing. 
As aptly put by Maiani (2016a: 102), the current regulation is just “one of 
several systems of responsibility-allocation that could theoretically be adopted 
under the EU Treaties”. It is thus of paramount importance to critically dis-
cuss at some length the main criteria so far employed in the Dublin system or 
proposed in the debate surrounding its reform and to explore the soundness 
of the possible alternatives. In doing so, the values at stake and the interests of 
the concerned parties will be taken into due account, as well as the fact that a 
perfect criterion simply does not exist. The real challenge is to single out the 
ones which are intrinsically sounder — according to constitutional principles 
and the exigency of rationality when managing a complex legal procedure 
57 See, for instance, UNHCR (2011: 8, 12); UNHCR (2017: 3-4). See also Klug (2014: 
60-61). For some concrete proposals, see Di Filippo (2014a); UNHCR (2015: 2-4).
58 See, for instance, Lagarde (1986: 194); Fernández Arroyo (2006: 247).
59 See Lagarde (1986: 194); Mills (2014: 230-235); Shaw (2001: 652-687).
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— and to develop a workable framework around them which includes a full 
implementation of art. 80 TFEU, innovative tools and fast track procedures. 
1. FAMILY RELATIONS AND THEIR ENHANCED ROLE  
IN A DISPLACEMENT SETTING 
While family unity, as a connecting factor, is traditionally put into rela-
tion with the human right to enjoy a family life (as enshrined in international 
provisions such as art. 8 ECHR or art. 7 EUCFR) and with the best interests 
of the child under the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, in 
this context, it is stressed that a correct assessment of its relevance is coherent 
even with the public interests of the Member States and of the EU. 
This ground for allocating competence has undergone a significant evo-
lution under the various stages of the Dublin legal framework. In particular, 
the Dublin III Regulation60 expanded the relevance of the family link com-
pared to the Convention61 and to the Dublin II Regulation62. In the proposal 
for a Dublin IV Regulation, the Commission envisages broadening the scope 
of family members to include siblings in any circumstance63, and this is a 
positive step. Nevertheless, this is not enough. 
An expansive notion of family would be preferable, and in particular the 
presence of relatives in a Member State deserves more careful consideration. 
In contrast to some European countries, in many countries of origin, relatives 
are as important in family life as the core family members, due to the cultural 
concept of family and the related moral obligations of mutual assistance and 
care. Moreover, on occasions when the original nuclear family may be dis-
persed or deceased, the only form of family life available to the asylum seeker 
may be represented by a cousin, an aunt or an uncle, a nephew or a grand-
parent. Finally, many asylum seekers have suffered a traumatic experience in 
their country of origin and/or during their journey to Europe, so that the 
closeness to persons coming from the same familiar milieu — regardless of 
how old the individuals at stake are — may prove to be fundamental for their 
psychological welfare and propensity to establish a collaborative and fruitful 
relationship with the local officers managing the asylum procedure and with 
the surrounding social environment. 
60 See art. 2 (g) and arts. 8-10.
61 See art. 4 of the Convention.
62 See arts. 6-8 Regulation No. 343/2003.
63 See art. 2 (g) of the draft text.
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In sum, a wide sample of family members (expanded to relatives) should 
serve as a connecting factor for any asylum seeker (and not only for unac-
companied minors) and would result in attributing competence to the State 
concerned64. Some adjustment might be framed (for instance, a hierarchy 
between core family members and relatives) and a requisite of proof of the 
capacity to take care of the asylum seeker might be introduced (especially 
for relatives). The time has come to look at (wider) family links as relevant 
connecting factors, to the benefit of the asylum seeker and the host State and 
the European Union as a whole. It is not casual that in the different (but not 
wholly unconnected) field of the provision of legal channels to get to Europe, 
two Member States have already accepted the involvement of relatives of asy-
lum seekers in humanitarian admission schemes65. In the end, forced displace-
ment obliges persons to build a new life: Who would not seek the support of 
his/her family environment in such a problematic endeavour?
2. THE “AUTHORISATION PRINCIPLE” AND THE COUNTRY  
OF FIRST IRREGULAR ENTRY
When criteria inspired by family ties are not applicable, the Dublin 
Convention and the ensuing Regulations have applied, in succession, several 
connecting factors inspired by the so-called “authorisation principle”, i. e. the 
assignment of responsibility to the State that played the most important part 
in the entry or residence of the person concerned: the State that issued a valid 
residence permit or visa (art. 12); or the State whose borders have been regularly 
(art. 14) or irregularly (art. 13) crossed by the asylum seeker. A residual criterion 
is represented by the State where the application is lodged (art. 15 regarding 
international transit zones in airports; art. 3 (2) as a final default heading). 
2.1. A connecting factor whose rationale is far from rational
The implementing practice shows that the irregular entry criterion is the 
most commonly used66. What is the rationale behind this connecting factor? 
64 A more liberal view has actually been employed in a similar instrument, i.e. the Cana-
da/US Agreement. Under art. 1 (1), “Family Member means the spouse, sons, daugh-
ters, parents, legal guardians, siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, 
nieces, and nephews”.
65 See the examples of Germany and Ireland reported in European Union Fundamental 
Rights Agency (2015: 6, 9).
66 See supra, footnote 7.
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Commentators agree on the fact that the drafters of the Dublin Convention 
and of the subsequent Dublin II and III Regulations intended to establish a 
linkage between the allocation of responsibility in the field of asylum and the 
respect for the MS’ obligations in the protection of the EU external border67. 
Put in another way, if a Member State does not reject an asylum seeker at its 
border, and lets him/her enter its territory, then it would be logical (sic) to estab-
lish the responsibility for assessing the asylum claim there, and if the outcome 
is positive, to define that MS as the new place of residence for the beneficiary 
of international protection. Nevertheless, the principle of non-refoulement is 
applicable on entry regardless of the efficiency of the checks at the external 
borders: A State managing an external border control cannot decide to au-
thorise or not the irregular entry of an asylum seeker, but is obliged to grant 
access to an asylum procedure to anyone who lodges an application. And — 
as everyone knows — the combined effect of the current EU visa policy, the 
EU/national carrier sanctions regimes, the smugglers’ tactics and the nature 
of the flows to Europe unavoidably causes an excessive burden for a few front-
line States. As has been aptly underlined by Hruschka and Maiani (2016: 
1524), this criterion “ends up encouraging lax borders controls or — worse 
— illegal pushbacks and other such practices”68. Additionally, asylum seekers 
cannot benefit from the occurrence of meaningful links with other MSs, thus 
generating the negative consequences mentioned above including secondary 
movements (supra, section III.1). All this is hardly coherent with the princi-
ples embodied in art. 78 TFEU and in arts. 18-19 EUCFR. 
What is not often underlined is that the number and identity of the 
frontline States may change over the course of time. Thus, in the first years 
of the implementation of the Dublin Convention, Germany was situated at 
the external border of the Schengen area and was concerned by consistent 
irregular flows coming from or through the Visegrad countries and from the 
Balkans. Later, the land border of the Schengen area shifted eastbound and 
southbound, so that currently, other MSs may face the effects of the first 
country of entry criterion. It is sufficient to consider the events that occurred 
in 2015-2016, which led to the pronouncement of the Court of Justice in 
67 See, for instance, Hruschka and Maiani (2016: 1523); Hurwitz (1999: 648, 657). 
This rationale is confirmed by the Commission’s Communication, “Towards a Re-
form of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to 
Europe”, COM (2016) 196 final, 6-4-2016, p. 7.
68 From the same perspective, see Morgades-Gil (2017); Thym (2016: 1550). For a 
critical assessment of Hungary’s policy in response to the 2015-2016 events, see Fer-
nández Arribas et al. (2016). For a worrying account on the trends emerging in several 
Member States, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018), pp. 2-7.
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Jafari: Considering that the Greek asylum system was still unable to fulfill its 
normal functions, the next responsible countries for the vast majority of the 
people fleeing the Syrian conflict and other unsafe countries of origin were 
Hungary or Croatia, according to the itinerary followed by the concerned 
persons. As aptly underlined by Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion 
in Jafari, such situation was unbearable for any national system, whether it 
was the Croatian one or any other69. This has been confirmed by the fact that 
the Dublin rules have been in part ignored (by transit countries, adopting a 
wave-through policy) and in part suspended thanks to the temporary availa-
bility shown by Germany to host asylum seekers coming from Syria70. How-
ever, after a few months, the German government felt compelled to revoke 
its openness policy, and later, Sweden and Austria reached a saturation point 
and asked the Council for a partial derogation71 of the implementation of the 
relocation scheme approved a few months before to the benefit of Greece and 
Italy72. In Spring 2016, a series of initiatives — partly elaborated and imple-
mented outside of the EU legal order — led to the “closure” of the Balkans 
route and to the adoption of the debated EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 
2016. A sort of normality was restored, but this was certainly not thanks to 
the Dublin rules. It might be argued that the 2015-2016 situation along the 
Balkans was exceptional and that the Dublin criteria usually work. But this 
is not the case, as abundantly revealed by the consistency of the literature, as 
mentioned above73. 
Thus, the abovementioned rationale is at odds with the basic principles 
of refugee law mentioned in art. 78 TFEU (and in the EUCFR) and produces 
an unbalanced distribution of responsibilities, contrary to the principle of sol-
idarity and fair sharing among the Member States reflected in art. 80 TFEU. 
69 Opinion of 8 June 2017, EU:C:2017:443, §§ 228-238.
70 This unilateral decision grosso modo recalled the so-called sovereignty clause enshrined 
in art. 17 (1) Dublin III Regulation: see Kalkmann (2015: 24); Maurice, E. (2015). 
Germany makes U-turn on Syria refugees. EUobserver, 11-11-2015. Available at: 
https://euobserver.com/migration/131062. 
71 See Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/408 of the Council, of 10 March 2016, on 
the temporary suspension of the relocation of 30% of applicants allocated to Austria 
under Decision 2015/1523 (OJ L 74, of 19 March 2016, p. 36); Decision (EU) 
2016/946 of the Council, of 9 June 2016, establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Sweden in accordance with art. 9 of 
Decision 2015/1523 and art. 9 of Decision 2015/1601 (OJ L 157, of 5 June 2016, p. 
23).
72 See the account given in the Sharpston’s Opinion, EU:C:2017:443, §§ 5-18. 
73 See supra, footnotes 3 and 7.
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Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this criterion and its confir-
mation in the Dublin III Regulation no longer have a reasonable justification. 
Additionally, it must be pointed out that the criterion here criticised is applied 
even to persons rescued at sea and to the State accepting disembarkation. This 
provokes a relevant tension over the system of search-and-rescue at sea, as 
already outlined74. 
An objective evaluation of this criterion, embracing both its purported 
rationale and its practical effects, should lead to a search for alternatives. 
2.2. The signals coming from the Court of Justice: a sober push for a change
The discomfort with this method for allocating competence led Advo-
cate General Sharpston to propose an interpretative approach, sensitive to 
arts. 78 and 80 TFEU, according to which art. 13 Dublin III Regulation 
would not apply where a sudden massive inflow of third country nationals 
occurs since it was not conceived for addressing such scenario75. In the view 
of the Advocate General, insisting on that criterion would run contrary to the 
purported objective of the Dublin III Regulation to found the allocation of 
competence on fair criteria, both for the Member States and the persons con-
cerned76. In the described scenario, the default criterion of art. 3 (2) would 
apply, i.e. the first Member State in which the application for international 
protection was lodged shall be responsible for examining it. The reading of 
art. 13 advanced by Sharpston — though intriguing — would end up in an 
indirect modification of the Regulation, rendering a free choice approach as 
the determining key for allocating competence77, albeit only in exceptional 
circumstances. 
I fully share the criticism of the first country of entry criterion, but re-
spectfully deem that such interpretation of art. 13 raises several concerns. 
First, it causes uncertainty about when the threshold of “sudden massive in-
flow” is triggered. Second, it is doubtful that the legislature, when adopting 
the Dublin III Regulation, did not take into account the eventuality of sud-
den massive inflows, causing a serious disturbance to the ordinary functioning 
of the responsible MS: The real trouble lies, instead, in the very fact that the 
Council and Parliament were aware of such scenario in 2013 and decided to 
74 See above, section III.3.
75 See Sharpston’s Opinion, EU:C:2017:443, §§ 178-189.
76 See recital 5 of the Dublin III Regulation.
77 Presumably, any applicant would lodge his/her claim in the preferred country of final 
destination.
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be satisfied by some remedial and ex post measures which are totally insuffi-
cient (see below). Third, if in the case of massive inflows, the frontline coun-
try is authorised to disregard the protection needs of asylum seekers and to 
let them pass through, so that they can lodge their requests for international 
protection in a subsequent Member State of their choice, what then occurs 
runs equally counter to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing among 
the Member States. Moreover, it creates an evident disturbance to the public 
order of the interested countries and increases the risks of violations of the 
human rights of the persons on the move, especially the most vulnerable ones. 
I will return to this issue in section IV.3. 
It must be recalled here that, if the AG has been perhaps too provocative 
in her reading of art. 13, on the contrary, the Court of Justice adopted an 
apparently conservative stance78. In a rather laconic fashion, the judges take 
note of (and fully endorse) the linkage established by the Dublin III Regula-
tion between the competence for an asylum application and the role played by 
a MS with regard to the entry into the EU of a third country national, even 
in the case when this happened according to a decision of a humanitarian 
nature79. The dubious rationale of this legislative choice is not even indirectly 
questioned, and a disturbing conception of Dublin as a sort of self-contained 
regime — impermeable by an evaluation under arts. 78 (1) and 80 TFEU — 
transpires in some passages80. 
Another finding of the Court may be questioned, i.e. its statement that 
in responding in an appropriate way to situations of massive inflows, several 
instruments are at the disposal of the EU and the MSs81. Such tools are the 
mechanisms regulated in art. 33 Dublin III Regulation82, Directive 2001/55 
on temporary protection83, the ad hoc measures which may be adopted under 
art. 78 (3) TFEU (such as the decisions on a temporary scheme for relocation 
for the benefit of Greece and Italy), and the unilateral recourse by the other 
MSs to the sovereignty clause under art. 17 (1) Dublin III Regulation. The 
fact that those instruments have proven beyond any reasonable doubt to be 
ineffective from the perspective of solidarity and fair sharing, as well as the 
78 Judgement 26 July 2017, Jafari, C-646/16, EU:C:2017:586.
79 Jafari, §§ 87-92.
80 Jafari, §§ 84, 89.
81 Jafari, §§ 94-100.
82 That is, the mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management.
83 Directive 2001/55/EC of the Council, of 20 July 2001, on minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and 
on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such 
persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, of 7 August 2001, p. 12).
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ability to secure quick access to a fair asylum procedure, seems to be unknown 
to the Court: With all due respect, this is quite disappointing. It seems diffi-
cult to resist the temptation to qualify the reasoning followed by the judges 
as a formalistic one. 
At the same time, it must be admitted that the position of the Court 
was not easy. The inability of the first country of entry criterion to address 
a massive inflow of displaced persons was self-evident, as it has always been: 
However, it was equally clear that affirming a jurisprudential allocation crite-
rion based on a substantially free choice would not have led to a more rational 
and undisputed setting. It is up to the legislature to draw a different frame-
work, taking into due account the guiding principles of asylum policy and the 
lessons learnt. Plainly, it was not correct to expect that the judgement could 
take the shape of a blueprint for the reform of the Dublin system. In the same 
time, some principled statement, even in the form of a targeted obiter dictum, 
would have been very welcome84. 
At first sight, a risk might thus be conceived that any attempt to revise 
the tenets of the Dublin III Regulation might now be qualified by some 
of the interested actors as superfluous in light of the somewhat neutral ap-
proach followed by the Court, especially if contrasted with the bold stance 
Advocate General. Nevertheless, a closer look at the judgement suggests 
that the Court in Jafari did not completely renounce playing a role. In a 
final passage of the judgement, the Grand Chamber fully endorsed a recent 
84 The issue might be raised of whether the Court, in the future, might reverse 
its prudent stance and be ready to declare the invalidity of art. 13 Dublin III 
Regulation based on its inconsistency with arts. 78 and 80 TFEU, which would 
eventually be read in conjunction with a constructive interpretation of art. 18 
EUCFR. The doubt advanced above on the unfair consequences of such a move 
retains its validity in this scenario. Additionally, it must not be ignored that the 
whole current Dublin machinery is grounded on a certain logic for the allocation 
of competence, and eliminating the first entry criterion would mean a rewriting 
of the system. Only a complex exercise of legislative and policy choices could re-
place the current rules (i.e. the various allocation criteria and the related aspects, 
such as the procedures and compensatory measures). This means that even in the 
more pro-active hypothesis, the Court would be obliged, after having declared 
art. 13 (or the whole Regulation) invalid, to suspend the effects of this decision 
until the EU legislature has adopted a new regulation. On the ground, the situa-
tion would not change, although it must be admitted that from this perspective, 
the Court would symbolically exert a primary role in shaping the future features 
of the Dublin system, putting the abovementioned primary principles (too often 
forgotten) at the centre of the debate.
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shift in the case law, operated by the Fifth Chamber in C. K.85, recalling that 
“under the second subparagraph of Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regula-
tion and Article 4 of the EUCFR, an applicant for international protection 
must not be transferred to the Member State responsible where that transfer 
entails a genuine risk that the person concerned may suffer inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter”. As 
a consequence, “such an applicant cannot therefore be transferred if, fol-
lowing the arrival of an unusually large number of third-country nationals 
seeking international protection, such a risk existed in the Member State 
responsible”86. This passage should not go overlooked. First, the Court is 
definitely recognising that the Dublin allocations cannot ignore the indi-
vidual risks to the applicants, even under the threshold of “systemic flaws” 
specified in art. 3 (2) Dublin III Regulation. Second, the Court, although 
in a sober fashion, is sending a clear message to the EU legislature: When 
a national asylum system is under a severe strain (not necessarily reaching 
the highly-demanding threshold of a systematic failure), the other EU MSs 
cannot pretend to enforce the first country of arrival criterion, thus opening 
the way to a different allocative output. It follows from the foregoing that 
the full respect for human rights emerges as a growing obstacle to the main-
tenance of the Dublin logic.
 If some anarchy and uncertainty must be avoided, the legislature is 
called to seriously think about another approach for allocating competence 
to the various MSs. Interestingly, on the same day as Jafari, the Court issued 
its judgement in Mengesteab87, purporting an applicant-sensitive reading of 
the time-limits for making a take charge request and thus transferring the 
responsibility to the originally competent MS. As a matter of fact, taking 
into account the usual duration of this kind of proceeding, the interpretation 
endorsed by the Court underlines the factual impossibility of enforcing the 
Dublin machinery as it stands. Again, a sober but unequivocal message is 
sent to the EU legislature: The structure needs a deep reform. Perhaps the 
Court might have been more courageous, but the judicial function, even at 
the constitutional level, does suffer from inherent limitations when complex 
policy choices are required in order to implement the principles embodied in 
primary law.
85 Judgement 16 February 2017, C. K. and Others, C‑578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, 
§ 65.
86 Jafari, § 101.
87 Judgement 26 July 2017, Mengesteab, C‑670/16, EU:C:2017:587, §§ 44-74.
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3. PARTY AUTONOMY: A CRITERION NOT FULLY SUITED  
FOR ASYLUM MATTERS 
As was mentioned earlier, a certain debate developed in the literature 
about the compatibility with the Geneva Convention of regional legislation 
reducing the scope of free determination by an asylum seeker about where 
to lodge his/her claim. However, the developments of international practice 
have shown that, under certain conditions, a system like the Dublin one may 
be deemed compatible with the Geneva Convention inasmuch as the latter 
would not afford a fully-fledged subjective right to choose a specific asylum 
country88. The EU MSs affirmed this conviction throughout the process of 
the conception of the Dublin Convention and in the subsequent drafting ex-
ercises of the two Dublin regulations, with the evident approval of the other 
political institutions involved in the decision-making process (i.e., the Com-
mission and the European Parliament). Lately, the same Court of Justice took 
a confirmative stance of such a reading of the Convention89.
What is now observed does not impede a discussion of a party autonomy 
or “free choice” approach from another point of view, one of efficiency and 
opportunity giving regard to the founding principles of the CEAS and the 
poor performance of the current rules on competence allocation. From this 
perspective, some NGOs and experts have proposed or deemed practicable 
giving a decisive role to the personal preferences of asylum seekers in the context 
of the Dublin system90, essentially for the sake of pragmatism and in light of 
the fact that usually, the subjective choice is motivated by the existence of some 
substantive link with the favoured country: This would maximise the asylum 
seekers’ trust in and agency within the CEAS and would minimise the coercive 
features of the current provisions. 
In considering the general features of the allocation of competence in in-
ternational settings — discussed above (section II) — it must be acknowledged 
that in many fields of private international law, a growing role is recognised 
for the autonomy of private parties in identifying the competent court for set-
tling legal claims or, in the alternative, for making recourse to arbitration91. 
88 See supra, section III.2.
89 Judgement 6 September 2017 (Grand Chamber), Slovakia and Hungary v. Council 
of the European Union, joined cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, EU:C:2017:631, §§ 
338-342.
90 See, for instance, Brandl (2004: 69); Carlier and Crépeau (2011: 665); ECRE (2008: 
29-30); Human Rights Council (2015: § 66); Maiani (2016b: 46-49); ProAsyl et al. 
(2013).
91 The same happens for the identification of the applicable law.
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However, this does not usually happen in cases in which the legal proceedings 
refer to inalienable rights or personal status relevant to the enjoyment of pub-
lic law rights. Moreover, the criteria for determining adjudicative power in 
criminal or administrative matters are defined by legal provisions according to 
the public interest and do not give room to the preferences of the individuals 
concerned. Given that the assessment of asylum claims is functional for the 
enjoyment of public law status and is often framed as an administrative law 
procedure, it would seem inappropriate to recognise the choice of the appli-
cant as having a primary role for assigning competence to a given State. 
In addition to that, two further aspects are, in my view, unconvincing in 
the “free choice” approach: 1) no public system for the reception and integra-
tion of forced migrants can avoid fixing some limits to its capacity92; 2) per-
sonal preferences are not only due to the existence of reasonable connections, 
but also to other considerations93, whose ultimate effects could negatively 
impact the most generous or efficient national systems and indirectly reward 
the most restrictive and inefficient States, contrary to the principle of solidar-
ity and fair sharing of responsibilities (art. 80 TFEU) and to the need to offer 
an appropriate status to applicants in line with the Geneva Convention and 
other relevant treaties (art. 78 TFEU). 
If it is true that a perfect approach does not exist, and that some form 
of corrective method should be envisaged in any case, as correctly noted by 
Maiani (2016b: 47)94, it is equally true that merely subjective choices may 
produce a sort of anarchy (which is unaffordable even for the most efficient 
State system) and could adversely affect the national budgets and the so-
cio-economic environment of the MSs and of the whole EU. Thus, what 
appears to be a pragmatic and non-dogmatic approach could easily turn into 
disorder and fuel political tension. This being said, the rationale of this pur-
ported approach may be adequately accommodated — at least in part — in a 
92 Considering the wide impact on the host society of high volumes of applicants (see 
above, section III), mere financial transfers from the EU or other MSs would hardly 
suffice as a compensatory measure.
93 The quality of the reception arrangements; the speed of refugee status determination 
and the recognition rate for a given nationality; the opportunity to find a well-re-
munerated job; the efficiency of the educational and health system; the information 
provided by informal networks, social media or even smugglers or “facilitators”; the 
concurrent closure or perceived “low quality” of other countries, etc.
 For similar concerns about the “free choice” model, see also Guild et al. (2014: 17, 
55); Guild et al. (2015: 56); Parusel and Schneider (2017: 128-129).
94 See also below, section III.4.2.
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scheme that achieves a more robust recourse to meaningful connecting factors 
and fully enforces art. 80 TFEU (below, section IV.4.2). 
4. THE “CLOSEST CONNECTION” CRITERION OR THE GENUINE  
LINK APPROACH 
As was outlined above (section II), in international law and in some ar-
eas of EU law, the allocation of competence (be it administrative or judicial) 
is usually guided or inspired by the idea that a substantial connection must 
exist between a State (including its legal order and socio-political community) 
and the persons or activities concerned. Additionally, the competent authority 
should be properly placed to be able to ascertain facts and manage the relevant 
procedure in an efficient and (hopefully) speedy way.
4.1. Its possible meaning in asylum procedures
What might this mean in the field debated here? Tacking stock of the 
drawbacks of the Dublin system identified so far (in section III, above) two 
aspects deserve attention. First, account should be taken — as much as pos-
sible — of the personal characteristics of the asylum seeker, of his or her ties 
with a given country and of the related potential for integration, in consid-
eration of the need for the prospective refugee to build a new life. Second, 
the competent State should be selected giving regard to the need to manage 
the asylum claim in an accurate and quick way, with the cooperation of the 
applicant and possibly with the help of the surrounding social milieau (thus 
reducing the costs for first reception and for integration).
The idea of establishing competence under the Dublin system according 
to a genuine link approach is not new, although the rules so far adopted at the 
EU level have conceded little room for such logic, with an exception made 
for the partial relevance recognised for some (strict) family relations (above, 
section IV.1). For instance, UNHCR (1979: § h) has emphasised the need to 
take into account the connections between an asylum seeker and the country 
which should take charge of him/her. In the context of the discussions around 
the Dublin system, UNHCR (2011: 5) stressed that the “notion of mean-
ingful links or connections includes family and cultural links, as well as legal 
residence in the Member State, but does not include the possession of a visa, 
or mere previous presence in that State’s territory”95. Scholars have already 
95 See also UNHCR (2016: 7), referring to family links, work or study links in a Mem-
ber State, or knowledge of a language.
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advocated the recourse to such method. Byrne and Shacknove (1996: 206) 
enumerated the following connecting factors: the legal presence in a given 
territory of family members; prior periods of residence for professional or ed-
ucational reasons; strong linguistic and cultural ties between the asylum-seek-
er and the putative asylum country; or the existence of a well-established 
expatriate community. Later, Maiani and Vevstad (2010: 144-145) referred 
to social networks in the broadest sense, linguistic affinities, and previous 
abode. Other experts have purported this view96. Specialised and authoritative 
NGOs have also voiced the need for a reconsideration of the Dublin logic97. 
In a consideration of secondary law, a significant reference to relevant con-
necting factors is traceable in the second decision on an EU-wide relocation 
scheme for the benefit of Italy and Greece98.
Sadly, in the Dublin IV proposal, the Commission did not sufficiently ad-
dress this point and summarily disregarded the relevance of the personal charac-
teristics of asylum seekers, showing in the reasoning a degree of confusion with 
the “free choice” approach99. Notwithstanding this, it is perfectly conceivable to 
give more weight to objective links between an asylum seeker and a given MS, 
96 See, for instance, Di Filippo (2015: 42-44, 55-56); Di Filippo (2016); Nascimbene 
(2016: 112); Pollet (2016: 95).
97 See Conference of European Churches (2016: 2-3); ECRE (2016: 5).
98 Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of the Council, of 22 September 2015, establishing pro-
visional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece (OJ L 248, of 24 September.2015, p. 80). Recital No. 34 of this Decision 
reads as follows: “The integration of applicants in clear need of international protection 
into the host society is the cornerstone of a properly functioning CEAS. Therefore, in order 
to decide which specific Member State should be the Member State of relocation, 
specific account should be given to the specific qualifications and characteristics of the ap-
plicants concerned, such as their language skills and other individual indications based 
on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could facilitate their integration 
into the Member State of relocation” (emphasis added).
99 See COM (2016) 270 final, 4 May 2016, p. 13. The explanatory memorandum of 
the proposal underlines that, according to some MSs, the criterion of first entry must 
be preserved, and that alternative connecting factors (such as personal preferences) 
would add confusion and give the wrong signal that asylum seekers can choose their 
country of final destination. In the meantime, it is acknowledged that other MSs and 
relevant stakeholders have called for a different vision, focusing on the preferences or 
characteristics of asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the explanatory memorandum merges 
the personal preferences and the characteristics of asylum seekers in the same concept, 
and uses the same argument to discard both the “free choice” approach and the “per-
sonal characteristics” one.
THE ALLOCATION OF COMPETENCE IN ASYLUM PROCEDURES UNDER EU LAW… 75
Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 59, enero-abril (2018), pp. 41-95
thus favouring the former’s speedy and efficient integration and indicating the 
country which is better placed to hear the case. 
As far as family ties are concerned, the need to embrace a wider vision 
of the concept of family, given the peculiarity of the context of forced dis-
placement, was discussed above. It is true that this enlarged notion of family 
might appear “too generous” to some commentators or to several Member 
States. Nevertheless, it could serve both as a cost saving tool and as a guiding 
principle for solving the issue of the overburdening of specified States100. In 
the first instance, members of the nuclear family (including siblings) should 
be relevant. In the absence of any of them, the presence of relatives might 
work as a connecting factor towards other countries. In the case of reception 
strain in one of the possible destination States, another one where a relative is 
present would become competent101. In doing so, (wide) family ties play a role 
in implementing the principles of fair sharing and solidarity.
Another element to take into account is a previous study or work ex-
perience in a given MS, or another form of regular stay which is not merely 
transitional: Compared to the lack of any relevant “contact” with a national 
community, a previous regular residence is usually capable of facilitating the 
interaction with the asylum decision makers (and other authorities involved) 
and creating the potential for integration, unless it is ascertained that anti-so-
cial behaviours occurred during that stay. 
Language skills are often invoked by the proponents of this approach. 
Some States whose official language is widely spoken outside of Europe (for 
instance, English, French or Spanish) might fear being penalised by this cri-
terion. Nevertheless, this connecting factor could pragmatically work even 
to indicate a State where the population in general and civil servants in par-
ticular are usually fluent in a second language (for instance, English in some 
northern European countries)102.
A challenging ground is the presence of a private sponsor. This poten-
tial connecting factor may cause some concern in terms of the risk of abuse, 
false declarations or coverage of illicit smuggling networks, but it should at 
least be the object of a serious and open-minded discussion. A starting point 
might be represented by the good practices developed in countries which have 
100 See also below, section IV.4.2.
101 The identification of the competent State when more relatives are present in the EU 
might be left to the applicant (if an adult) or might be done according to the best 
interest of the applicant (if a minor).
102 As for the risk of overburdening, see below, section IV.4.2.
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developed more experience in such field (i.e. Canada, Italy and France)103. In 
a globalised world, where transnational activities and personal mobility are 
physiological, a person may well act as a point of reference or a sponsor for a 
third-country national (TCN), for instance, due to a previous professional or 
personal exchange developed during a stay in Europe or even in third coun-
tries. Thus, in addition to relatives (see above), private individuals — whether 
they are EU nationals or TCNs regularly residing in the EU — may have a 
strong and verifiable personal link to an asylum seeker. A similar reasoning 
might apply to non-profit organisations or firms, subject to some eligibility 
requisites. In the different but comparable setting of legal avenues to reach 
the EU, the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (2015: 6) recently 
argued that private sponsorship is one of the most promising and under-ex-
ploited means. The recourse to such a scheme would be even easier to imple-
ment in the context of intra-EU relocations, compared to transfers from other 
continents. 
A further element that might be taken into account is the holding of 
professional qualifications or academic titles released by the institutions of the 
MSs or, if released by a third country, easily recognisable on the basis of legal 
tools facilitating such equivalence. The network of bilateral treaties already in 
force between the Member States and the third countries of origin and the 
current cooperation programmes in the field of education and training re-
quire a proper evaluation. In fact, they could offer pragmatic solutions where-
by the then recognised refugee could play the role of a proactive economic 
actor, instead of depending heavily on public social assistance.
One may question which of these factors is more suitable and what 
pre-requisites should be established to put them in place. This is the task of 
the legislature: A decisive (and welcome) step in that direction has been taken 
by the European Parliament with the mentioned Wikström Report104. From 
103 See Fratzke (2017); Kumin (2015); Yahyaoui Krivenko (2012). 
 On the pilot projects sponsored by religious entities in Italy, see Gois and Falchi 
(2017); Morozzo della Rocca (2017). France, and more recently, Belgium have fol-
lowed this example (see https://goo.gl/jg3hgs). See also the New York Declaration, § 
79 and Annex I, §§ 10 and 14.
104 See, in particular, amendments 108-131. It must be noted that the need to obtain 
wide support among the political groups led the LIBE Committee to adopt a cautious 
version of links such as sponsorship (amendment 124), professional or educational 
diplomas (amendment 117), language skills or other socio-cultural ties (amendments 
127-129). This choice might reduce the impact of the new approach in terms of ap-
plicants genuinely connected with a given MS, as pointed out, for instance, by Maiani 
(2017: 638). It would undoubtedly be preferable to have a more robust recourse to 
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the viewpoint of the scholar, I deem it important to stress that new legal par-
adigms do exist and may be seriously explored in order to alter the current 
overall unsatisfactory performance of the Dublin rules. 
4.2. The risk of new imbalances and the need to give teeth to article 80 TFEU
In applying this new approach, it must be acknowledged that a few 
Member States, which are already under strain as a result of having been more 
generous or open in the shaping of their migration or asylum policy in the 
past, might become the responsible country as a consequence of what has 
been described — although in the context of the free choice method — as 
a “snowball effect”105. In addition, it may well be that an applicant does not 
satisfy any meaningful connection with a MS: Thus, how this person should 
be allocated remains to be seen. 
Notwithstanding their sounder rationale, the connecting factors dis-
cussed here, like the others described above, do not cover all the allocation 
needs and are not a panacea. A frank and unbiased discussion of the possible 
criteria reveals that they cannot act alone because their operational effects may 
produce, in any setting, unfair or inefficient results, including the engagement 
by Member States in free riding and burden shifting. In accordance with the 
lessons learnt, the decisive step is not to blindly opt for one allocative link or 
another. Rather, a preference for one or some of them (deemed per se more 
rational and sound) should always be accompanied by a framework in which 
fair sharing and solidarity are shaped as the inspiring principle of the system 
of allocation of asylum seekers, as required by art. 80 TFEU106 and solemnly 
reminded by the Court of Justice in the relocation dispute107. From this per-
spective, it is simply untenable for some States to undergo a relevant pressure 
(as frontline countries or as second-line favourite places of final destination), 
while others give scarcely relevant support, or no support at all. The fact that 
this issue is a politically sensitive one, with some MSs maintaining non-col-
laborative aptitudes, does not alter the circumstance that hosting asylum seek-
ers and assuming responsibility is an obligation under international and EU 
such criteria, but at the same time, the strong incentive to the MSs to accept appli-
cants asking for the activation of such a connecting factor must be underlined, given 
the interest in filling their own share with persons who are easier to integrate in their 
respective societies (see infra, section IV.4.2).
105 Williams (2015: 22).
106 In a similar vein, see Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (2015: 33, 37-38); De 
Bruycker and Tsourdi (2016b). 
107 Judgement 6 September 2017, EU:C:2017:631, §§ 252, 291.
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law binding all the MSs and that each designated MS carries out this task in the 
interest of the whole EU and of the entire Schengen area. In light of this, 
the allocation of competence must be organised in full compliance with art. 
80 TFEU, covering the whole set of responsibilities108. This is not to say that 
persons must be shared as if they were objects, or that pragmatism must lead 
us to think that only a market-oriented method would be viable109. Rather, 
taking into account the imperatives of EU primary law, a balanced combina-
tion of a fair division of labour among the MSs, rational competence criteria, 
and appropriate cooperative mechanisms among the relevant actors (national 
authorities and applicants) must be devised.
Initially, a weighting mechanism should be conceived, leading to attrib-
ute to each MS a fair share of potential applications. This method is far from 
being a novelty in EU law, being practiced in different fields: voting power 
in the Council, number of seats in the European Parliament, contribution to 
the EU budget, distribution of EU funds, etc. The Commission110 and the 
European Parliament111 have already preconised this idea, although with some 
108 From this perspective, the idea that solidarity could be declined according to a vary-
ing content, depending on the unilateral availability of each MS, was put forward 
in November 2016 by the Visegrad countries (coordinated by the Slovak rotating 
presidency of the EU Council), under the heading of “effective solidarity” or “flexible 
solidarity”: see the Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 Countries 
of 16 September 2016 (https://goo.gl/Bwiv3M) and the “Non Paper” of the Slova-
kian Presidency released in November 2016 (https://goo.gl/vclOHs). This view is 
untenable. Processing asylum claims, organising a first reception system, managing 
the stay of recognised refugees or the situation of denied applicants: all these activities 
impinge on the national budget, the public administration, the judiciary, the territory 
and the society as a whole. It is simply absurd to think that only certain States should 
take charge of all these headings, while others could confine themselves to deploying 
specialised personnel or providing some financial contribution. More than an effec-
tive solidarity, this idea resembles another vision, i.e. one of “variable unilateralism”. 
109 See, for instance, the model developed by Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport 
(2014). 
110 See “Proposal for a Regulation establishing a crisis relocation mechanism and amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an appli-
cation for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third 
country national or a stateless person”, COM (2015) 450 final, 9-9-2015. See also the 
Dublin IV proposal.
111 See “Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the situation in the Mediterranean and the need 
for a holistic EU approach to migration (2015/2095(INI))”, A8-0066/2016, 12-4-
2016, §§ 33-38; Wikström Report, pp. 112-114.
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variations. Which criteria should concur to determine the shares and their 
relative weight may be subject to discussion112, but the overall idea is de-
fensible and fully in line with arts. 78 and 80 TFEU. Here it is emphasised 
that — thanks to the shaping of allocation criteria that are robustly inspired 
by a meaningful connections approach — each MS would be authorised and 
encouraged to fill its share with asylum seekers having a connection with 
the country, in order to reduce the difficulties in their integration, conduct 
a quicker procedure in an applicant-friendly environment and, finally, min-
imise the impact on the national budget and the local society113. To put it 
differently, the MSs should not consider mandatory shares or quotas as an 
inadmissible threat to their sovereignty. Rather, they form a component of 
a more complex construction aimed at minimising the negative impact for 
every EU country in the fulfillment of pre-existing legal obligations and pre-
serving the integrity of the Schengen area, which has otherwise been jeopard-
ised by the disappointing record of the current Dublin system114.
The discussion of mandatory shares makes sense only if the overall pic-
ture is taken into due account. In order to depoliticise this matter, a descrip-
tion of the possible functioning of a new allocative machinery proves useful, 
drawing some inspiration by the positions advanced by the Commission (in 
the Dublin IV proposal) and the European Parliament (in the Wikström Re-
port) and tacking stock of the experience accumulated by the EASO. The 
applications lodged in the whole EU would be collected through an auto-
mated and centralised system, which would monitor, in real time, the evolu-
tion of the situation. The individual applicant would be allocated to the MS 
with which a genuine link exists. Absent a substantial connection with one 
Member State, or if the designated country has already exceeded its assigned 
share115 and no other MS has a (lesser) connection with the applicant, the 
only reasonable default criterion should be to designate a country which is not 
performing its assigned share, in accordance with art. 80 TFEU and the need 
to quickly identify a competent State. In order to give limited but equally 
significant room to the asylum seeker’s inclination, the latter might be given 
the possibility to choose among the countries which are below their share of 
112 For a detailed assessment of the main proposals advanced in the public debate (and 
of the possible outcomes in terms of shares assigned to each MS), see Parusel and 
Schneider (2017: 49-67).
113 For some interesting remarks from that perspective, see Thielemann (2018: 79-80).
114 For an economic analysis sharing a similar perspective, see Rossi (2017). 
115 An exception should be made for family members, especially if minors are involved. 
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allocations116. With the view to facilitate this choice, the option to employ 
a matching tool, such as the one developed by the EASO in support of the 
relocation process from Greece, might be explored117.
In order to stay pragmatic, it must be highlighted that one of the main 
elements of mistrust by asylum seekers towards the current Dublin system 
is the risk of being obliged to stay or move to a country with which they do 
not have any substantial link. Under the proposal formulated above (section 
IV.4.1), which significantly expands the relevance of the meaningful connect-
ing criteria, this risk is significantly reduced. However, the possibility still 
exists for an applicant to be allocated to a MS under the default criterion of 
the country that has not yet honoured its assigned rate. In the meantime, 
the Member States with limited experience in hosting asylum seekers often 
express an explicit or implicit resistance to accepting foreigners (regardless of 
whether they are entitled to international protection) under a compulsory 
scheme. 
In order to address these possible sources of tension, the option sug-
gested above (the chance for the applicant to choose among the MSs under 
their share and the employment of a matching tool) might be a first device to 
limit such possible discomfort118. Second, and even more decisively, a qual-
ified freedom of movement of the beneficiary of international protection119 
might be envisaged, according to the following terms. If after the recognition 
of refugee status or subsidiary protection by the designated MS the benefi-
ciary receives an effective job offer in another MS, and the security checks 
are fulfilled, he or she should be entitled to accept it while the prospective 
host country should not be allowed to apply the “Community preference” or 
similar protectionist measures. Three positive effects could be accumulated: 
a better allocation of the workforce, recuperation of some consideration for 
the self-determination of the refugee, and the recognition of the legal value 
116 The Wikström Report provides for the drafting of a list of four States with the lowest 
number of applicants relative to their share, among which the applicant would be 
allowed to choose the destination country: see amendments 172-173. As aptly un-
derlined by Maiani (2017: 639), it would be more convenient to widen the choice 
among all the MSs “below quota”. 
117 See https://www.easo.europa.eu/easo-matching-tool.
118 The expressed preference would give some assurance of the will to develop a positive 
relationship with the host country, especially if oriented by a matching tool.
119 The issue is not new and has been repeatedly evoked by qualified NGOs and experts 
— in the context of a broader discussion on the transfer of international protection 
status — as a tool for addressing the failures of the Dublin system: see inter alia Eu-
ropean Council of Refugees and Exiles (2014); Favilli (2015); Peers (2012).
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of his or her economic proactivity (where present)120. The legal basis for such 
qualified freedom of movement for work purposes would derive from art. 79 
(2) (b) TFEU121 (read in conjunction with art. 45 (2) EUCFR), and might 
be translated into an extension of the scope of some provisions of Directive 
2004/38/EC (valid for EU nationals)122, or in the enactment of ad hoc provi-
sions, which might be inspired (with some adjustments) by arts. 14-23 of the 
Directive 2003/109/EC on third-country nationals123. From this perspective, 
such freedom of movement would also contribute to providing (at least par-
tial) substance to the call for a “uniform status of asylum for nationals of third 
countries, valid throughout the Union”, contained in art. 78 (2) (a) TFEU. 
The issue should be raised as to whether, after voluntary establishment in 
another MS, the protection duties should continue to bind the original MS 
or should be transferred to the second one124, or whether such duties should 
simply cease. 
Be that as it may, the combined effects of mandatory (but proportionate) 
shares for each MS, genuine links as the primary allocation criteria, a limited 
right of choice and a qualified freedom of movement for the applicants might 
120 For a similar approach, see Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (2015: 39, 60-
61); Den Heijer et al. (2016: 611-612); Parusel and Schneider (2017: 129-130).
121 The different legal basis employed for the reform of the Dublin system (art. 78 (2) (e)) 
might explain the absence of this issue from the Commission’s proposal and from the 
Wikström Report. However, given the identity of legislative procedure applicable, an 
act being based on both the legal basis is conceivable.
122 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 29 April 
2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States (OJ L 158, of 30 April 2004, 
p. 77).
123 Directive 2003/109/EC of the Council, of 25 November 2003, concerning the status 
of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (OJ L 16, of 23 January 2004, 
p. 44).
124 For the discussion of this topic, see E. Guild et al. (2015: 39-51, also for additional 
references). Lately, it has been proposed by Mitsilegas (2017: 736-738) that a robust 
regime of mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions should be affirmed, in-
cluding the transfer of protection duties to the receiving MS and the equal treatment 
with refugees therein already recognised as such. Although sharing the call for the 
introduction of devices that make mutual recognition in the CEAS more refugee-sen-
sitive, I am afraid that linking the transfer of protection duties to a second MS to the 
sole will of the recognised holder of international protection (as Mitsilegas seems to 
suggest) would pave the way to an excessive burden for some MSs, thus raising the 
issue of the correct implementation of art. 80, as pointed out when discussing the free 
choice approach in general terms (above, section IX).
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have three concurrent beneficial effects: 1) depriving of substance the aprio-
ristic opposition by some Governments to a more rational and a fairer distri-
bution of tasks throughout the Schengen area; 2) eliminating the temptation 
for some MSs to play a burden-shifting game against other MSs; 3) properly 
addressing the legitimate call — shared by, inter alia, Costello (2016: 275) 
and Maiani (2017: 641-644) — to devise a Dublin system that eliminates its 
most evident coercive features and is thus able to gain the trust and coopera-
tion of applicants.
4.3. Procedural issues and standard of proof 
As repeatedly recalled herein, the lessons learnt from other legal settings 
treating the allocation of competence must be kept in mind. Thus, a critical 
discussion regarding new or different criteria cannot avoid taking into ac-
count the need to address the issue of the procedural implementation of the 
criteria and of the feasibility of the same, according to the overall exigency of 
efficiency and coherence.
From this perspective, a strong objection to a genuine link approach 
might be the following. The criteria based on family ties or on other ele-
ments (such as having first entered another country), currently specified in 
the Dublin III Regulation, did not work well in practice due to the adminis-
trative difficulties in managing communications between different State ad-
ministrations and in relying on declarations not often supported by official 
documentation. If this occurred with (strict) family ties, things might only 
worsen if broader meaningful links — whereby the number and nature of 
relevant circumstances to verify are even greater — were specified in a new 
Dublin Regulation. To put it differently, the approach based on a wide array 
of meaningful links could prove unrealistic, stretching the already stressed 
bureaucratic machinery. 
However, this argument is not fully convincing. First, what has imped-
ed inter-State cooperation on family ties (in the Dublin II and III versions) 
or other factors from working is, by and large, the conflictual situation in 
which the Member States are placed under the current Dublin fabric: as 
Maiani (2016a: 110-111) well explains, the cause of the insufficient coop-
eration among the MSs is deep in the structure and ethos of the Dublin 
System, centred on transferring applicants elsewhere and thus creating win-
ners and losers in a game in which national interests are pitted one against 
the other. If the innovative idea of a system of shares is enacted, then the 
MSs will be stimulated to fully exploit the chance to fill their own shares 
with persons who are likely to create fewer concerns. Second, any alloca-
tive machinery must be designed based on the acceptance of the idea that 
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asylum seekers are often persons who have fled from dramatic contexts with-
out a concrete chance to prepare a fully-fledged dossier to face the Dublin 
or RSD procedures. Such procedures are different from civil or criminal 
law litigation with the related standard of proof. In asylum proceedings, 
a pragmatic procedural approach must be adopted if the purpose of the 
Geneva Convention and other primary sources (the ECHR, the TFEU and 
the EU Charter) are not to be frustrated125. At least to a certain extent, the 
“Dublin stage” must be adapted to such an evidentiary approach, as it is 
merely ancillary to the main RSD procedure. For this reason, any revision 
aimed at introducing more suitable connecting factors cannot avoid endors-
ing the idea that an inter-State procedure must be inspired by a prima facie 
or fast-track approach126 in order to work effectively. From this perspective, 
it should not be forgotten that in any area in which the EU has pursued 
the objective of realising an integrated or common space, simplified mech-
anisms of dialogue between State authorities and generous recourse to the 
techniques of mutual recognition have been developed. It is sufficient to 
consider administrative fields such as the ones discussed above (section II) 
or the mutual recognition of professional titles and qualifications. In the 
context of the EU area of freedom, security and justice mention can be 
made of transnational civil and commercial proceedings and of the police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters127. 
The recent stance adopted by the EU institutions seems to move in the 
right direction. According to the Wikström Report, any applicant should 
present a claim in the first country of arrival and submit to an identification 
process. At the same time, the application would be registered under a Eu-
ropean database. The authorities of this first country of arrival would then 
conduct a personal interview, pursuing two concurrent aims: ascertaining 
the prima facie presence of connecting factors (i.e. the genuine links men-
tioned above) with one or more EU Member States and verifying the secu-
rity issues128. The authorities of the potentially designated Member State 
125 A thorough analysis of this issue is not possible here. Inter alia, see Goodwin-Gill 
and McAdam (2007: 53-60); Noll (2005); UNHCR (2011, §§ 195-205); UNHCR 
(2013).
126 Sadly, light evidentiary requirements and accelerated procedures seem to be welcomed 
by States or by the EU only if they are aimed at refusing to grant protection: see, for 
instance, Costello and Hancox (2016); Reneman (2013).
127 For a similar perspective, see Mitsilegas (2017: 725, 732-734).
128 Contrary to what often happens with the Dublin III Regulation, cooperation with 
identification and the mentioned evaluations is to be expected, thanks to the advan-
tages for the asylum seeker from the perspective of being allocated to a State that is 
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would be called upon to cooperate in order to conduct such prima facie 
verification in the least possible time (even exploiting the possibilities of-
fered by modern technologies, existing tools and EASO facilitation)129. In 
order to discourage mala fide behaviours by the claimants, a rule would be 
introduced according to which — if the designated State later finds that the 
claimed substantial link does not correspond to reality — the person will 
be allocated through the centralised system to another country, in a casual 
manner130.
The Member State — which is genuinely connected with the asylum 
seeker — shall accept the allocation of the asylum seeker and will complete 
the examination of the asylum claim131. In order to reassure MSs other than 
frontline countries, it is indispensable to underline that a burdensome part of 
any procedure for the application’s assessment (the identification and tracing 
of family members) would already have been completed with the highly prob-
able cooperation of the interested person. Moreover, the existence of family 
and/or social ties in the host country would make the management of the 
rest of the procedure and the prospective process of integration into the host 
society easier and quicker, reducing the room for social tensions and populist 
or xenophobic propaganda. As already specified (see above, section IV.4.2), 
applicants not connected to any MS should be quickly allocated to one of the 
MSs which is “below quota” chosen by themselves. 
Whether the solution proposed here would produce lengthy procedures 
or an excessive administrative burden on the first MS of entry may be ques-
tioned. The issue of the speed of the procedure has already been addressed, if 
a genuine link approach and a prima facie assessment procedure are endorsed. 
Moreover, we must wonder what the alternatives are. Under the current 
presumably more appropriate (see above, section IV.4.1). At the same time, the length 
of procedures will be reduced and thus also the associated costs (now present) of host-
ing or controlling persons whose identity or status is far from clear.
129 See the Wikström Report, amendments 28 and 151.
130 See the Wikström Report, amendments 151-152.
131 As an alternative, it might be conceived that the country where the claim is lodged 
will carry out the evaluation of the asylum claim. Were a positive decision to be 
awarded, it would gain automatic recognition in the country of destination. In this 
way, however, a heavy burden could be put on the few States interested by first entry 
(or disembarkation), which are already under a severe strain. Moreover, during the 
evaluation period of the claim and the possible supplementary period of the decision 
of the legal recourse against a possible denial, the asylum seeker would be obliged to 
stay in a country where he/she could have no substantial links, with the inconvenienc-
es mentioned above (supra, section III). 
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Dublin III Regulation, the country of first entry is already obliged to conduct 
significant administrative activity regarding the registration of the claim, the 
determination of the competent State and subsequent steps: a file is created, 
human resources are employed, time is spent on this activity, an interview is 
conducted, the asylum claimant is hosted somewhere, and reception condi-
tions must be guaranteed. The European Parliament is proposing to trans-
form this early stage into a step showing a friendly face to the applicant. The 
relevant administrative activities would be greatly facilitated by the asylum 
seeker’s cooperation, while a different scenario would probably lead to a form 
of legal challenge by the applicant or to his/her absconding. In my opinion, 
the solutions elaborated by the EP deserve careful consideration, and it would 
be advisable for the Governments (meeting in the Council and in its prepara-
tory bodies) to conduct an unbiased and open-minded discussion on this 
complex dossier.
V. CONCLUSION
The Dublin system can and must emerge from its isolation from other 
areas in which competence is assigned to States and enter a phase of maturity. 
The guiding principles of the CEAS (including fair sharing and solidarity) 
must receive primary consideration in the drafting of EU rules governing the 
allocation of competence in asylum procedures. Stronger recourse to mean-
ingful links and the assignment of permanent allocation shares to all MSs are 
indispensable and mutually reinforcing devices for pursuing a true overhaul 
of the current disappointing Dublin fabric. 
At the same time, it must be underlined that a modification of the al-
locative criteria and the definition of mandatory shares cannot be pursued in 
isolation. Such processes should proceed together with the revision of the pro-
cedural rules (in harmony with the peculiarities of asylum matters and after 
first looking at simplification) and the resumption of the debate on a regime 
of economic freedom of movement for recognised refugees. 
The approach discussed here and many of the solutions envisaged in 
the Wikström Report could reduce tensions among the Member States on the 
debated topic of burden sharing, purporting a rational and pragmatic way to 
establish a balance between the needs and aspirations of the asylum seekers 
and the needs of the Member States (both the frontline ones and the others). 
It would render the asylum seeker a co-protagonist in the procedure, discour-
aging elusive conduct and promoting cooperative behaviour. The applicant 
will have no need to abscond and conduct a de facto rebellion against the sys-
tem in force, or at least will not able to invoke a reasonable excuse for doing it. 
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As I tried to demonstrate, it is hard to believe that a new approach would 
make things more complicated or burdensome for the national services: En-
tirely to the contrary, it would bring some order to a chaotic situation and 
would reduce the grounds for the sterile recriminations between the Member 
States. Moreover, the scarce public funds might be better addressed and used, 
without the unnecessary waste of money and time. This way, a new Dublin 
system would also be a useful tool for addressing the relevant concerns of 
public opinion, dismantling specious arguments and rebuilding confidence 
in the governance abilities of the EU and its Member States. 
In contrast, the maintenance of the traditional Dublin logic (although 
with some innovations, such as a permanent corrective mechanism)132 would 
reproduce the defects and bad practices of the current legislative framework 
(widely described above in section III), to the benefit of two categories of 
interested ‘stakeholders’: smugglers and populists. 
Last but not least, I am aware that a robust discussion is urgently needed 
regarding protection-sensitive external action on asylum (tackling inter alia 
the issue of the legal avenues to access Europe for the applicants133) and the 
translation into an operative formula of the target — too often forgotten by 
the EU legislature — of a “uniform status of asylum for nationals of third 
countries, valid throughout the Union” (art. 78 (2.a) TFEU): These topics, 
however, go far beyond the limits of this contribution.
132 The approach endorsed by the European Parliament in the Wikström Report — al-
though some integration might be desirable — appears convincing, insofar as it pro-
poses a real overhaul of the current system. On the contrary, sadly, the stance of the 
Commission and of some Governments presents the defect to stop halfway in the im-
plementation of the guiding principles of the CEAS and in the acknowledgement of the 
structural defects of the system. In fact, it envisages a mix of the known criteria with a 
corrective relocation mechanism (voluntary in normal circumstances and mandatory 
in situations of serious crisis). For a synthesis of these lines, see Communication of the 
Commission, “Commission contribution to the EU Leaders’ thematic debate on a way 
forward on the external and the internal dimension of migration policy”, COM (2017) 
820 final, 7.12.2017, p. 6.
133 In order to promote a virtuous circle between intra-EU fair sharing and the EU con-
tribution toward alleviating the pressure on non-EU countries of first asylum, it could 
be foreseen that the shares might also be filled with asylum seekers admitted under 
resettlement schemes or other legal humanitarian channels. From this perspective, it 
seems commendable that the Wikström Report proposes to include such persons in 
the automated system for the collection of applications and in the calculations for the 
fulfilment of the relevant shares: see amendments 25 and 46.
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